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„The ideas which come to your mind in reading my book are
protected by copyrights. To think over them is prohibited
without the prior permission of  the author.”
Viktor Pelevin, Generation ‘P’ (1999)
1. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE
It goes without saying that knowledge and information are the most valu-
able commodities in the new economy. Though knowledge and information 
as private goods could provide great business opportunities for rights hold-
ers in the global communications network, they exhibit the distinctive char-
acteristics of public goods (Samuelson 1954, 387-389; Stiglitz 1999, 308-325). 
Therefore, the commodification of knowledge and information requires a 
strict proprietary regime which restrains free access to them and enforces 
effective legal protection over their production, use, and dissemination. If 
the accessing and using rights of the individual users were free and unlim-
ited the legal entitlements of rights holders would be worthless. 
The pervasiveness of the new information and communications techno-
logies as powerful learning and knowledge sharing systems and the digital-
ization of knowledge and information goods facilitate their production, use, 
and dissemination, and at the same time make difficult and expensive to en-
force effective proprietary regulation and control over them. In addition to 
the difficulty and the high transaction costs of the legal enforcement of pro-
prietary rights, the social climate does not seem to be particularly support-
ive to the propertization of knowledge and information in the global com-
munications network. In spite of the current trends of restrictive legislation 
and jurisdiction as well as of expansive and unprecedented private legisla-
tion of the rights holders, society persistently tends to believe that know-
ledge and information mainly belong to public goods and resists accepting 
their growing private appropriation and effective proprietary control over 
their production, use, and dissemination. Briefly, knowledge and informa-
tion are usually conceived as a common pool of symbolic resources for the 
cultural reproduction of society. So, people are not willing to pay for know-
ledge and information goods to regain what they believe to be rightfully en-
titled to know, use,  and contribute to.  Without  the empowerment of the 
possession  and  exercise  of  these  basic  individual  rights  and  freedoms, 
people merely are kept aloof from becoming active, informed, and engaged 
citizens of political-cultural community. 
The rights holders also endeavor to control the flows of all forms of com-
puter-mediated contents by means of the private ordering of accessing and 
using rights of users in combination with copy-protection technologies, di-
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gital rights management systems, platform dependent applications, micro-
payment system, zoning, and so forth (Benkler 2006, 397-459). They go well 
beyond the initial rights and legal entitlements originally assigned to them 
by  the  law  and  habitually  infringe  the  basic  constitutional  rights  and 
autonomy of the users, like freedom of expression, the right to privacy, and 
the right to fair trial by taking advantage of the opportunity of forum shop-
ping via private contracts (Balkin 2004, 19-22; Boyle 2000, 345-350; Guibault 
et  al.  2007,  156-157;  Netanel  2000,  1879-1886;  Walker  2003,  24pp).  These 
private encroachments on the users’ individual rights and liberties further 
incite  discontent  and resistance.  It  is  not  surprising  that  hackers,  cyber-
punks, outlaws, and code breakers are usually regarded as public heroes 
and heroines in urban folklore who fight the enclosure of the public domain 
and the infringement of constitutional rights and liberties of the users. They 
are rarely stigmatized as villains therein.
2. THE TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS OR THE ANTICOMMONS?
Besides  this  common belief,  many legal  scholars,  philosophers,  scientists, 
and social scientists also emphasize that knowledge and information are so-
cial and cultural products made, shared, settled, and revised in democratic 
discourses, open scientific debates, and the pragmatic self-understanding of 
society.  Therefore,  the  basic  notions  of  mainstream  economic  paradigm 
about scarcity, exhaustibility, rivalry, and excludability, which are the dis-
tinctive  characteristics  of tangible  goods,  can be hardly applicable  to the 
production, use, and distribution of knowledge and information (Kaul et al. 
1999, 3-17). In some respects, knowledge and information are not fit into the 
framework of neoclassical economics. Each individual can maximize the use 
of knowledge and information goods without  exhausting the original  re-
sources,  passing  an  excessive  cost  burden onto  others,  leaving  anybody 
worse off than before, or excluding anybody from parallel exploitation and 
enjoyment.  The overexploitation of knowledge and information does not 
bring about economic shortage and social threat; meanwhile, their underex-
ploitation  could  lead  to  economic  backwardness  and  social  degradation 
(Vanneste et al. 2004, 13-14). An open-access regime does not have inevit-
ably harmful  effect  on social  welfare,  artistic,  cultural,  and scientific  ad-
vancements as some law and economics scholars endeavor to argue against 
the public domain referring to Demsetz’s theory on the impact of negative 
externalities in the development of property right system and Hardin’s pop-
ular metaphor about the tragedy of the commons (Demsetz 1967, 347-359; 
Epstein 1989, 1488-1489; Hardin 1968, 1243-1248; Landes and Posner 2003, 
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471,  487-488).  As a consequence  of  positive  externalities  and network ef-
fects, knowledge and information will never be exhausted under an open-
access regime. In lack of rivalry, an open-access regime does not cause con-
gestion or overcrowding in the use of knowledge and information, either. 
The opposite is the case: hedonistic and flamboyant behaviors in the con-
sumption of knowledge and information goods are quite desirable. There-
fore, converting Adam Smith’s frequently quoted proposition, every prod-
igal man appears to be a public benefactor, and every frugal a public enemy 
in the production,  use, and dissemination of knowledge and information 
goods (Smith 1776, Book II, Ch III.). Under an open-access regime, know-
ledge and information will be continuously proliferated. Meanwhile, under 
a proprietary regime, the strict private control of the production, use, and 
dissemination  of  knowledge  and  the  flows  of  information  can  cause 
scarcity, underprovision, inefficient resource allocation, endowment effect, 
holdup problems as well as deadweight social losses and cultural entropy 
(Heald 2007, 35-41; Gordon 1992, 153-163, 177-180; Netanel 1996, 306-336; 
Posner 1992, 277-278; Schultz 2002).
According to the mainstream economic paradigm, non-rivalry and non-
excludability  of  knowledge and information goods are especially  serious 
impediments which could frustrate the rights holders to recover production 
costs and to earn return on investments even if demands are sufficient and 
society attributes high cultural and economic values to innovative know-
ledge and novel information goods. For the reason that each additional user 
can consume knowledge and information goods, whether it is on-line news-
paper article, scientific paper, directory, symphony, or software once they 
have been produced, at zero almost marginal costs, the market itself is not a 
proper organization to set price above them. Knowledge and information as 
public, non-rival, and non-exhaustible goods are truly idiosyncratic to the 
established system of the market economy and the basic tenets of neoclas-
sical  economics.  Therefore,  knowledge  and  information  as  proprietary 
goods entirely rely on the existence of intellectual property laws and the ef-
fective legal enforcement of rights holders’ proprietary claims. Indeed, the 
law  itself  transforms  knowledge  and  information  into  commodities.  By 
marking out the boundary corners of knowledge and information goods in 
the elusive fields of culture and staking out the legitimate claims of rights 
holders in  terms of the strength,  scope,  and duration of protection,  gov-
ernance, excludability,  and exclusivity, the law makes knowledge and in-
formation scarce, rival, exhaustible, and excludable economic resources in 
order to recover the production and development costs and to ensure the 
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economic gains and further commercial opportunities of private beneficiar-
ies.  The imposition of legal, judicial,  and technological  constraints on the 
production,  use, and dissemination of knowledge and information goods 
serves the aims of the refutation of the basic feature of culture, science, and 
communication as a collaborative enterprise and the reinforcement of the 
well-established division between producers and consumers (Barthes 1974, 
4-5). If the law provides individuals and business entities with proprietary 
rights and legal entitlements over the production, use, and dissemination of 
knowledge and information goods, non-owners’ rights and freedoms will 
be inevitably circumscribed. 
The rise of the global communications network as a new public forum 
for collaborative enterprises, creative endeavors, and information exchange 
is juxtaposed with the private appropriation of knowledge and information 
goods from the outset. The enormous success of the global communications 
network demonstrates that it can very efficiently fulfill the functions of pro-
duction, use, and dissemination of knowledge and information. Since the 
global  communications  network has  become a  cornucopia  of  knowledge 
and information in the last fifteen years, it proves that the digital amplifica-
tion and global accessibility of the public domain materials do not fade the 
entrepreneurial spirit of innovation away. The operation of the whole net-
work has been based on end-to-end principle, open standards and protocols 
from the outset. The exponential increase of cultural and technological in-
novation renders the well-established economic argument inapplicable, that 
is  to  say,  exclusive  proprietary  rights  over  knowledge  and  information 
goods  are  necessary  to  create  suitable  incentives  for  owners  to  produce 
them and efficiently exploit their inherent economic values. Economic and 
traffic data do not support the fear of underproduction of knowledge and 
information goods owing to the liberal or relaxed intellectual property re-
gime as the advocates of strict and extended regime complain. And what is 
more, its smooth and evolving operation is also feasible from the economic 
point of view. The dynamic development and the economic success of the 
global communications network confirm that the benefits of rights holders 
excess the costs of their investments at comfortable profit margin. However, 
it still needs to be proven that the expanding propertization of knowledge 
and information goods – ranging from gene sequences and mathematical 
theorems to scientific data collections, software algorithms, cartoon figures 
and so on – and the complete internalization of the economic benefits  of 
their  inventions  and  uses  will  enhance  social  welfare  in  general;  their 
private appropriation and the creation and enlargement of exclusionary an-
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ticommons will further stimulate the amplification of their production, use, 
and dissemination (Balkin 2004, 26-31; O’Rourke 2000, 1178-79). 
3. PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE
GOODS, AND REGULATORY GIVINGS
Paradoxically, the more our written, visual, and acoustic culture becomes a 
collaborative venture in the global communications network, the more ef-
forts for withering away the public domain and fencing in knowledge and 
information goods are made. The attempts of turning knowledge and in-
formation  into  proprietary  goods  have  been  revealed  in  the  profound 
changes of intellectual property regime in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. The old intellectual property regime was intended to strike the fair 
balance between the economic interests of the authors and the benefits of 
society. The early framers laid down in the British Statute of Anne (1710) 
and the Constitution of the United States (1788) that the primary aim of the 
copyright law was „the encouragement of learning” or „to promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”. 
Especially, the latter document emphasized the primacy of social interests 
over authors’ economic rights. The Berne and the Paris Copyright Conven-
tions (1910, 1971) and the formerly enacted intellectual property laws had 
been gradually detached from these original intentions. Although they cere-
monially recited the advancement of science, culture, learning, or the im-
portance of public benefits  in their preambles,  they focused for the most 
part on the economic interests of rights holders. However, these copyright 
provisions in regard to the limited strength, scope, and duration of protec-
tion,  governance,  and  exclusivity  were  fairly  generous  with  non-owners 
and future authors as compared with the current trends of legislation. The 
fair use doctrine, for instance, served the very purpose of intellectual prop-
erty laws, namely, the encouragement of public engagement in cultural re-
production, learning, and creative works. In general, the provisions of intel-
lectual  property  laws  still  reflected  some  concern  of  distributive  justice 
among past, present, and subsequent generations of authors and of society. 
Since the mid-1990’s, the consecutive amendments enacted by the World 
Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and dif-
ferent national legislatures have significantly extended the strength, scope, 
and duration of protection, governance, excludability and exclusivity and 
introduced more  and more  trade-centered and industry-specific  –  some-
times ephemeral and bizarre – provisions into intellectual  property laws, 
which mandate the use of certain technologies and devices, inhibit, or en-
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tirely prohibit others. Today, three basic documents – the WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (1994), the WIPO Copyright 
Treaties  (1996),  and the Digital  Millennium Copyright  Act  of  the United 
States (2000) – establish the legal framework of intellectual property laws 
for national lawmaking processes worldwide. In the European Union, the 
the European Copyright Directive on Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society has become the 
part of the acquis communautaire since 2001. By the mid-2006, all member 
states of the European Union have implemented the Directive into national 
law. Though, a few of them – like Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, and Hun-
gary – a bit alleviate some controversial provisions on fair use or technolo-
gical protection measures in national law. In any case, the European Copy-
right Directive on Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Re-
lated Rights in the Information Society also follows the current trends of in-
tellectual property rights legislation, to wit, intellectual property is mainly 
considered as trade-related matter for legislature, jurisdiction, and enforce-
ment and framed this statutory law in terms of economic law (Guibault et 
al. 2007, 1-16, 169). 
The new provisions of these international treaties and laws strive for set-
ting the course of future technological development as well as for determin-
ing the human use of knowledge and information goods in the global com-
munications  network  biased  in  favor  of  the  commercial  interests  of  the 
present corporate rights holders.  Contrary to the vindication of the early 
framers for striking a fair balance between the rights of authors and the in-
terests of society, the persistent control of access to knowledge and informa-
tion goods in the global communications network is the main focus of the 
prevailing intellectual  property laws,  today. International  bodies  and na-
tional legislatures are much more concerned with the effects of demand di-
version  and rent  dissipation  of  corporate  rights  holders  that  may result 
from the global use of the new information and communications technolo-
gies and the progressive migration of knowledge and information to free 
zones  of  digital  environment  than  the  overall  social  and  economic  con-
sequences of economic rent-seeking, endowment effect, holdup problems, 
and deadweight social losses for global welfare. 
The recent framers affirm the proprietary claim of rights holders who 
simply regard the spread of knowledge and the free flow information in the 
global  communications  network as  knowledge spillovers  or  negative  ex-
ternalities which impose economic losses on them. They identify the intrins-
ically  cumulative nature of research,  innovation,  information,  and know-
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ledge production with the problems of knowledge spillovers or negative ex-
ternalities which cause imperfect market allocation of resources and send 
false signals for the investors. If the protection of intellectual property rights 
is liberal and if the market for knowledge and information goods operates 
imperfectly,  knowledge  spillovers  generate  economic  values  for  third 
parties the deficient operation of these legal and economic institutions pre-
vents rights holders to capture the full economic benefits of their rights and 
legal entitlements. In this way, spillovers can be defined as the gap between 
private  and  social  returns  on  knowledge,  information,  and  innovations 
(Frischmann and Lemley 2007, 262). By enacting the new intellectual prop-
erty regime, the legislators intend to eliminate or at least to narrow this gap. 
For the legislators, exclusive property right arrangements, effective techno-
logical protection measures, and public legal enforcement appear to be ap-
propriate legal institutions and technical means to confer hitherto uncom-
pensated positive externalities on rights holders. 
Nevertheless,  knowledge, information,  and innovations generate quite 
sizeable knowledge spillovers for third parties which Harold Demsetz and 
other  property  right  theorists  consider  as  the  unrealized  assets  of  rights 
holders.  It follows from this  view that the just rewards of rights holders 
should be very close or probably equal to social values of knowledge and 
information goods. Many economists estimate that the private rate of return 
on innovations is not higher than 25%, meanwhile society at large internal-
izes about half of their total benefits. Moreover, rights holders have to share 
the economic benefits  of the new innovations with competitors who can 
cheaply introduce their imitations and substitutes into the market without 
bearing the high costs of  research and development.  As Kenneth Arrow 
pointed out,  the more important  the  innovations  are,  the  wider  the gap 
between social and private rates of return becomes (Arrow 1962, 622; Benk-
ler 1999b, 435-440). In this context, the basic questions to be addressed are 
whether  the  above-mentioned  distribution  of  private  and  social  returns 
should be regarded as a suboptimal economic outcome of a liberal intellec-
tual property regime, and whether a strict proprietary regime which enables 
rights holders to internalize total economic benefits is desirable and feasible 
from social and economic points of view. The legislature’s answer to these 
questions is affirmative. On the one hand, ownership rights over intangible 
and tangible goods merits the same level of protection, especially, the right 
to exclude should be equally applied to intangible and tangible properties 
in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of non-owners. On the other, as 
law and economics  scholars frequently emphasize,  the exclusion of third 
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parties  from  capitalizing  upon  the  spillovers  of  the  uses  and  reuses  of 
knowledge and information goods at behest of rights holders sets the im-
perfect market allocation of knowledge and information goods right, and 
generates additional incentives to invest in the production of more creative 
goods. The notion of additional incentives for developing new ideas, what 
the framers of the new intellectual property regime and property theorists 
put forward, does not provide a sound economic argumentation for the in-
troduction of a strict intellectual property regime. A strict intellectual prop-
erty  regime  may  promote  the  full  economic  exploitation  of  the  creative 
works of the recent rights holders. But if  the right holders exercise strict 
control over accessing to and using knowledge and information goods it 
undermines the conditions for the creative activity of future creators.
The size of the gap between private and social  returns on knowledge 
and  information  depends  on  the  distinctive  features  and  importance  of 
knowledge and information goods rather than on the strictness of intellectu-
al  property  regime  and  the  effective  enforcement  of  proprietary  rights. 
Knowledge spillovers are mostly the results of positive network externalit-
ies,  creative, improved, recombinative, and innovative uses and reuses of 
knowledge and information goods. To be sure, these could occasionally im-
pose losses on rights holders,  especially,  if  the new ideas  render the old 
ones obsolete. But the overall outcome of a liberal intellectual property re-
gime is social welfare enhancing. Legislative intervention in the reallocation 
of the positive externalities of the uses and reuses of knowledge and inform-
ation goods on behalf of rights holders can not be justified on social welfare 
consideration. 
Social welfare and constitutional considerations – like freedom of speech 
and distributive justice – necessitate limited proprietary rights and broad 
fair use rights. However, in the context of mainstream economic paradigm, 
the fair  use provisions of the former intellectual  property regime are ex-
plained as the unintended outcomes of market failures,  namely, the high 
transaction costs of protection, administration, enforcement, and bargaining 
over the terms and conditions of use prevent rights holders to internalize 
the full economic benefits of their rights and legal entitlements. Therefore, 
legislatures  significantly circumscribed the breadth and scope of fair  use 
provisions for sharing, recording, displaying, and storing digital contents in 
the  whole  corpus  of  the  prevailing  intellectual  property  laws  and grant 
comprehensive  control  and authority  over  all  manifestations  of  possible 
uses and reuses of knowledge and information goods to private and corpor-
ate rights holders (Benkler 1999a, 26-30; Birnhack 2006, 505-517; Bradford 
2005, 7-15; Nimmer 2000, 673-674; Nunzinato 2002, 64-77). 
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The provisions of intellectual property laws in force and the new private 
ordering schemes throw off the well-established balance between the eco-
nomic interests of rights holders and the benefits of society. These provi-
sions not only discourage conversations among recent creators but also dis-
count the future benefits of subsequent generations’ and push higher costs 
onto them. As a result of the enlargement of the strength, scope, and dura-
tion of proprietary rights over knowledge and information, the recent gen-
eration of rights holders leaves on and transmits to the public domain less 
than that passed on to them. The exclusive and almost persistent ownership 
rights of the present right holders impose significant limitations on present 
and future creators who will be impeded to build freely upon their prede-
cessors’ and contemporaries’ ideas and progresses, and to incorporate some 
elements into their own works. As a result of abandoning the principle of 
intergenerational justice among past, present, and subsequent generations 
of creators, the prevailing intellectual property laws convert their tradition-
al cultural bonds of building upon each other’s advancement into licensor-
licensee  relationship.  The innovations  and creative  expressions  of  subse-
quent creators will be stifled if they can not afford to pay for transformative, 
critical, derivative, improved, parodistic, or recombinative uses of some ide-
as and information conveyed by pre-existing works (Carroll 2006, 875-878; 
Nunzinato 2002, 84-85; Oddi 2002, 59-64; Rawls 1971, 288-293). Since trans-
formative,  critical,  derivative,  improved,  or  parodistic  works  frequently 
suppress demands for the original ones, the reallocations of legal entitlements 
will  be presumably obstructed if  the economic interests of rights holders 
and future creators or their other motives are in conflict with each other. 
Since the law itself turns knowledge and information goods into com-
modities, it is difficult to employ precise utility calculus or price mechanism 
to measure whether the new and extended proprietary rights, their public 
legal  enforcement  and private  ordering  schemes  can efficiently  optimize 
their production, use, and dissemination in the global communications net-
work; or to put it in other words, whether these public and private institu-
tional arrangements are the most advantageous to enhancing social welfare 
of present and subsequent generations. The advocates of the prevailing in-
tellectual property regime usually refer to Demsetz’ theory of the origin and 
efficiency  of  private  property  rights  which  is  thought  to  buttress  their 
strong  arguments  for  the  propertization  of  knowledge  and  information 
goods and the redefinition of property rights in digital environment (Bell 
and Parchomovsky 2005, 548, 560; Epstein 2006, 9-11; Frischmann 2006, 12-
14; Levmore 2003, 192-94). Briefly, the argument is as follows: technological 
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innovations make the bundle of previously determined property rights over 
knowledge and information goods incomplete because the new information 
and communications technologies provide new opportunities to create fur-
ther economic benefits for non-owners without reaping the fair rewards of 
rights holders’ investments. Externality problems and the allocative ineffi-
ciency of the market coordination apparently bring about the redefinition of 
the incomplete bundle of property rights, if the benefits of new property re-
gime outweigh the costs of control, administration, and enforcement. In this 
view, the increase of the economic values of knowledge and information 
goods is corollary to the incessant process of privatization, the redefinition 
of existing property rights, and the private appropriation of their economic 
values in order to improve the allocative efficiency and smooth operation of 
the market. They simply leave out of consideration that the bundle of prop-
erty rights over knowledge and information goods is always and inevitably 
incomplete because we do not possess perfect knowledge to predict and de-
lineate all of their economic benefits, future uses and reuses in advance. In 
case of knowledge and information goods, incompleteness should be rather 
considered as the consequence of dynamic and generative progress in the 
production, use, and dissemination of knowledge and information than of 
the imperfectly defined bundle of property rights. Besides its harmful effect, 
the permanent rearrangement of the bundle of property rights does not of-
fer any constructive market solution to maximize private returns because 
the restrictive legal control over the dynamic and generative characteristic 
of knowledge and information production which restrains the possibilities 
of knowledge spillovers lessens their overall economic values. So, the use of 
knowledge and information  goods always produces  economic values for 
third parties which come from their non-rival and non-excludable features 
as  well  as  the  positive  feedback of the growth of  knowledge in  society. 
Briefly, the spread of knowledge and the free flow of information in society 
are not uncompensated takings. Therefore, it is neither efficient nor consti-
tutional if the law forces all recent and future beneficiaries into customer or 
licensee position in order to avoid externality problems. In spite of the pro-
found  differences  of  ownership  between  physical  and  symbolic  assets, 
Demsetz became convinced after a slight hesitation in his influential essay 
that  his  land  ownership  paradigm  is  applicable  to  intellectual  property 
rights system, too. He claims without further arguments that there are simil-
ar externality problems in the use of land and ideas. If externality problems 
emerge from the use of knowledge and information goods, the redefinition 
of property rights is necessary to restore the allocative efficiency of the mar-
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ket coordination. So, a well-defined proprietary rights automatically lead to 
the  most  efficient  use  of  new ideas  if  the  benefits  derivable  from  these 
private  symbolic  assets  will  be  concentrated  on  their  creators  (Demsetz 
1967, 359). Following the line of Demsetzian analysis, the progressive prop-
ertization of knowledge and information goods and the parallel decrease of 
the public domain can be expected in order to maintain the efficient alloca-
tion of the market if  the benefits  of private rights holders’  appropriation 
outweigh the costs of the control, administration, and enforcement of their 
legal entitlements.
As this misleading analogy between physical and symbolic assets illus-
trates,  the new intellectual  property regime is  in lack of solid theoretical 
foundation.  The  laws  justify  the  new provisions  on  the  basis  of  natural 
rights theory (Lockean labor-desert concept) and of utilitarian theory, re-
spectively. Nevertheless, these two rival philosophical theories have differ-
ent and sometimes conflicting priorities. Rights-based approach does not al-
low any concession about the original rights and entitlements of rights hold-
ers on behalf of efficiency advantages while utilitarian approach does not 
rule out the possibility that the effort of welfare maximization may result in 
the denial of some rights and legal entitlements of rights holders. Giving 
priority to social benefits over the inherent rights of authors, the first intel-
lectual property laws followed utilitarian approach. The prevailing intellec-
tual property regime habitually claims the priority of the inherent rights 
and legal entitlements of rights holders over social welfare and leaves little 
room for other considerations as if it were the most beneficial arrangement 
for rights holders as well as society at large. In spite of the unique character-
istics of the production, use, and dissemination of knowledge and informa-
tion as they are explained above, the laws take the original rights and legal 
entitlements over them for granted. Although, the justifications of the inher-
ent rights and initial entitlements over great many public domain materials 
– for instance, gene sequences, software algorithm, data collections, news, 
press coverages, plain facts, words and expressions, obvious business meth-
ods, concepts, abstract ideas, and color schemes – to exclude others are vig-
orously disputed from legal, moral, and economic points of view (Levmore 
2003, 193-94; Merges 1999, 581-588; Reichman and Uhlir 2003, 319-322). On 
account of the economic benefits of exclusive rights and the absence of the 
legal protection of public interests, the fraudulent assertions of ownership 
notices to the public domain materials became widespread practice in the 
global communications network (Aufderheide and Jaszi 2004, 9-10; Mazzo-
ne 2006, 1038-1047). 
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Whenever legislature assigns new property rights and valuable legal en-
titlements it also has to mimick the market, because the justification of the 
current rearrangement of property rights is based not only on natural rights 
theory but on presumed market failures. Though, knowledge and informa-
tion goods do not behave like typical market goods in economic transac-
tions.  As  a  consequence  of  the  redefinition  of  the  bundle  of  intellectual 
property rights, knowledge and information goods as commodities rather 
resemble  regulatory  givings  or  government  subsidies  than  real  market 
goods:  legislature  provides  exclusive  and  almost  persistent  ownership 
rights for individuals and corporate rights holders over them, sets the ex-
tended strength, scope, and duration of their proprietary rights and legal 
entitlements,  and  regulates  their  production,  use,  and  dissemination  en-
dorsed with technological measures and detailed statutory provisions (Bell 
2003, 229; Dibadj 2003, 1045-50; Liu 2004, 87-166). Instead of price mechan-
ism  of  competitive  market  or  free  bargaining  over  preferred  terms  and 
prices towards the equilibrium position of parties, prices and terms of use 
of knowledge and information goods are to a large extent determined by 
the original assignments of property rights and legal entitlements as well as 
monopoly power of rights holders. The rights holders’ monopoly position 
encourages rent-seeking behavior, creates market externalities, leads to en-
dowment effect – namely, in property rights bargaining the owners value 
their legal entitlements higher and demand more money to exchange than 
they would be willing to pay for acquiring them –, and imposes significant 
social costs on society. The advocates of market solution have to puzzle out 
the following contradiction:  meanwhile  a simple market  transaction may 
not efficiently allocate knowledge and information goods without the effect-
ive legal enforcement of rights holders’ proprietary claims, a strict and com-
prehensive intellectual property regime does not efficiently fulfill the pur-
pose of maximizing their social values and creates disutilities. 
The current changes in intellectual  property regime result  in losses of 
non-owners which they are usually averse to bear. Broad and widespread 
infringement of proprietary rights and legal entitlements is a case in point. 
From economic point of view, the infringements of owners’ rights reduce 
the social costs of a strict intellectual property regime caused by exclusion, 
rent-seeking,  fragmentation,  endowment  effect,  and  deadweight  social 
losses, and to certain extent neutralize some of these detrimental effects on 
non-owners  and  society  at  large.  These  are  almost  unavoidable  con-
sequences  of  the  current  intellectual  property  regime  because  the  rights 
holders’ monopoly position and the enforcement of their legal claims pre-
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vent market mechanism or property rights bargaining to correct the ineffi-
cient allocations of property rights in digital environment. So, it is hard to 
prove  that  the  incessant  extension  of  legal  entitlements  and  monopoly 
power of rights holders over determining prices and terms of use of know-
ledge and information goods in economic transaction maximize their social 
values and enhance social welfare. Contrary to Demsetz’ insights into the 
efficiency of private ownership over the public  domain,  if  the sheer eco-
nomic benefits derivable from knowledge and information goods are con-
centrated on rights holders, it results their less efficient uses and diminishes 
their social values. In case of ideas, a lenient intellectual property regime is 
likely to produce more utility  for all  parties  and to create more welfare; 
meanwhile a strict intellectual property regime leaves everyone worse off. 
Thus,  economic  theories  over  private property,  efficiency,  and incentives 
seem to offer a less feasible explanation of the motivation of recent trends in 
intellectual property legislation than public choice theory. 
4. PRIVATE ORDERING
The prevailing intellectual property laws, international treaties and agree-
ments are captured by the vested interest of corporate rights holders in im-
plementing  strict  and comprehensive  proprietary  rights  over  knowledge 
and  information  goods  (Benkler  1999b,  400-408;  Birnhack  2006,  516-517; 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2002; Elkin-Koren 2005; Frischmann 2006; Sell 2003). 
Nonetheless, corporate rights holders seldom stay within the bonds of the 
intellectual  property  laws  and  regularly  use  mass  market  licenses  and 
standard form contracts in order to contract around the provisions which 
they assume to be suboptimal for maximizing their own economic benefits. 
For the reason that most provisions of the prevailing intellectual property 
laws are default rules, rights holders are free to override them. At the same 
time, the compulsory and binding provisions of contract arrangements, li-
censes,  and digital rights management about the terms and conditions of 
use of knowledge and information goods are beyond the scope of the cur-
rent  intellectual  property  regime.  The  intellectual  property  laws  do  not 
provide legal protection and legal remedies for non-owners against unfair, 
non-negotiated, unreasonable, abusive, and forced contract terms which are 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, or any kind of copyright misuse 
of rights holders like false claims, intrusive content controls, the extension 
of monopoly position beyond the scope of the law, the private derogation of 
the public policy intentions of legislature expressed in the law, the different 
sorts of „paracopyrights”, and so forth. Therefore, corporate rights holders 
are able to minimize the possibility of state and judicial interference in the 
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management of their own proprietary rights and to make more efficient and 
unilateral allocation decisions on their behalf. In doing so, they usually pro-
hibit otherwise legitimate fair uses of copyrighted materials in contracts. In 
addition, they supersede the nuanced rules of the current intellectual prop-
erty laws and further expand their exclusive rights over knowledge and in-
formation goods – especially,  plain facts,  data collections,  public  domain 
materials,  words  and  expressions,  mathematical  formulae,  compilations, 
color schemes, symbols, customer’s personal data, obvious business meth-
ods, concepts, and so forth – to which they are initially not entitled by the 
law (Moffat 2007, 11-20; Radin 2004, 1-15; Lessig 2004). This trend somehow 
confirms Demsetz’s prediction,  namely, as the economic values of know-
ledge and information goods grow so further attempts on their private ap-
propriation can be anticipated. The redefinition of property rights by the 
law and private ordering will inevitably occur if the benefits of new and en-
larged property rights outweigh the costs of control, administration, and en-
forcement of legal and contractual obligations of non-owners. 
The proliferation of private ordering by means of mass market licenses 
and standard form contracts brings about the preemption of the provisions 
of the prevailing intellectual property laws. The European legislators expli-
citly intended to promote contractual arrangements about the use of copy-
righted materials in the Directive on Copyright in the Information Society in 
the hope of encouraging the rights holders to grant fair, personalized, and 
competitive contract terms to their contracting parties (Guibault et al. 2007, 
136-138,  153).  The  prevalence  of  private  contractual  arrangements  in  the 
global communications network would be welcome if it were relied upon 
the voluntary, rational, deliberate, and informed consent of parties. As it is 
frequently emphasized, fair contract provides the most efficient welfare-en-
hancing institution for coordinating the transfer and exchange of property 
rights and legal entitlements among the members of society. Alas, the great 
majority of contracts completed in the online world does not depend upon 
aggregatio mentium or consensus ad idem, namely, the meeting of the minds of 
the parties. Terms and conditions of use of or access to knowledge and in-
formation goods, which were negotiated, drafted, and agreed upon mutual 
consent of parties, can be barely found in contractual arrangements. Stand-
ard form contracts, mass market license terms and conditions are deliber-
ately drafted on a take-it or leave-it basis. The main purpose of private or-
dering is to eliminate or impede the choice of non-owners in the global com-
munications network. 
254 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 3:2
Though, this general business practice is not devoid of paradox: private 
ordering regime offers an appealing perspective to wither away fair  uses 
and the public domain in order to maximize the economic benefits of cor-
porate rights holders as well as to preempt the biased and restrictive provi-
sions of the recent intellectual property laws by means of providing free – 
or at least less constrained – access to knowledge and information goods. 
Private ordering gives corporate rights holders further opportunities to cre-
ate their own private legislation and to impose less favorable or even unfair 
and unreasonable terms and conditions on their non-drafting parties. At the 
same time, it could also fulfill the principle of distributive justice and equity 
among present and subsequent generations of creators and users as it is the 
case of many innovative initiatives like Free Software Foundation and other 
projects of open source movement, Creative Commons, Open-CourseWare, 
iCommons, Science Commons, Patent Commons, Magnatune, and so forth. 
These ventures represent alternative business models for the creation and 
distribution of knowledge and information goods, although none of them 
contests  the  very  foundation  of  the  proprietary  claims  of  private  rights 
holders over them, namely, all  chunks and quanta of knowledge and in-
formation which may have actual or potential economic significance can be 
lawfully appropriated and privatized. Nevertheless, they accommodate to 
the  current  trends  of  propertization  of  knowledge and information  with 
some altruism.
Whether private ordering regime serves the private interests of corpor-
ate rights holders or the public benefits solely depends on the benevolence 
of  rights  holders.  Their  feeble  inclination  towards  fair  share  principle  is 
manifested in the fact that the great majority of rights holders prefers to en-
large their proprietary rights over the public domain materials and to create 
their own rights against the world rather than to offer fair and reasonable 
terms and conditions of the use of what they are entitled to own in order to 
„promote the progress of sciences and useful arts”. In effect, private order-
ing could facilitate the spread of knowledge and the free flow of informa-
tion, but typically takes the form of private legislation, which narrows the 
possibilities of non-contracting parties,  as well. In this way, the matter of 
ownership becomes the key issue for virtually all kind of computer-medi-
ated interactions to which exclusive rights are attached by the law or private 
legislation in the digital world. Therefore, private ordering could at most be 
a compassionate endeavor for protecting and enlarging the public domain 
but far from an effective panacea against the harmful economic, social, and 
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cultural  consequences  of  the  prevailing  intellectual  property  laws  and 
private legislation. 
Regarding the production, use, and dissemination of knowledge and in-
formation as essentially collaborative enterprise, it is quite reserved propos-
al to appeal to rights holders for a gesture of goodwill, virtue, and decency 
without scrutinizing the legitimacy, social fairness, and economic efficiency 
of the current intellectual property regime over knowledge and information 
goods as defined by the law. Well-defined and exclusive property rights are 
indispensable for promoting the allocative efficiency of the market in the 
world where economic resources are scarce, exhaustible, rival, and exclud-
able.  Though,  the  deference  to  this  well-established  paradigm about  the 
primacy of private goods over public goods is neither self-evident nor par-
ticularly productive in case of knowledge and information to which these 
economic phenomena can be hardly applied.
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